Columbia shuttle disaster analysis

Registro bibliográfico

  • Título: Columbia shuttle disaster analysis
  • Autor: Vargas Cubides, Mario Jheinner; Aryan Bunbuarka, Fransiskus Ass; Videira Alvez, Fernando
  • Publicación original: 2010
  • Descripción física: PDF
  • Nota general:
    • This report provides analysis of the problems in Columbia Shuttle disaster in 2003 which is found in the article “Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures” by Barry Shore. Mainly based on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, information has been found that NASA was created as a governmental organisation which depends directly to the United States Congress and the White House. NASA culture at that time was arrogant due to the state of the art technology they had which convinced them they had the pioneer in the space industry.
      However, it has also been found that communication between teams or department did not flow effectively which unfortunately caused this Columbia Shuttle disaster. Moreover, evidences found to support Shore’s assertions to this Columbia Shuttle disaster which are conservatism, overconfidence, and recency. Based on those assertions, cultural change is suggested to deliver similar project effectively.
  • Notas de reproducción original: Digitalización realizada por la Biblioteca Virtual del Banco de la República (Colombia)
  • Notas:
    • Resumen: NASA; PMO; Project failures; Project management
    • © Derechos reservados del autor
    • Colfuturo
  • Forma/género: texto
  • Idioma: inglés
  • Institución origen: Biblioteca Virtual del Banco de la República
  • Encabezamiento de materia:

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